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Abstract:	  
A	  critical	  review	  of	  the	  mechanisms	  that	  are	  described	  in	  literature	  to	  explain	  the	  onset	  
and	  development	  of	  eruption	  or	  blow	  up	  in	  forest	  fires	  is	  presented,	  given	  their	  great	  relevance	  
for	  fire	  safety,	  particularly	  in	  canyons.	  The	  various	  processes	  described	  in	  the	  literature	  that	  are	  
considered	  as	  potential	  causes	  of	  fire	  eruption	  are	  discussed.	  Some	  of	  them	  seem	  more	  likely	  to	  
cause	  the	  phenomenon	  and	  the	  others	  seem	  to	  have	  a	  complementary	  role	  in	  some	  conditions.	  
The	   current	   review	   highlights	   that	   more	   research	   is	   required	   to	   create	   a	   classification	   of	   Fire	  
Eruption	  types	  and	  to	  allow	  the	  development	  of	  specific	  Fire	  Safety	  procedures	  for	  fire	  fighters	  to	  
minimize	  accidents.	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Introduction 
In certain conditions forest fires can exhibit an extreme behaviour that is 
characterized by very large rates of spread and energy release. We consider the 
following types of extreme fire behaviour: (i) Eruptive fires, (ii) crown fires and 
(iii) spot fires. In this paper we analyse the eruptive fire behaviour given its 
relevance for fire safety because it has been associated to a large number of fatal 
accidents in many parts of the World, like for example all those that are 
mentioned in Table 1 below.  
The designation of fire eruption was proposed in Viegas [1] given the similarity 
between the convection column that is produced by a volcanic eruption and that 
created by a forest fire that experiences a sudden acceleration of its rate of spread 
that is a characteristic property of this type of fire behaviour. These fires are also 
referred to blowups or flashovers in literature. Analysis of past accidents shows 
that in many cases the fire erupted modifying its previous behaviour and surprised 
the fire fighters that were in its vicinity and caused their death. An analysis of past 
accidents in which multiple fatalities occurred led us to the conclusion that the 
main part where related to eruptive fire behaviour [2-17]. 
 
Table 1  
Some accidents with multiple fatalities associated to extreme fire behaviour in 
canyons 
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Case Year Place Country Victims Biblio. Reference 
1 1949 Mann Gulch USA 13 Rothermel [2] 
2 1953 Rattlesnake USA 15 Cliff et al. [3] 
3 1966 Sintra Portugal 25 Viegas [4] 
4 1984 La Gomera Spain 20 Viegas et al. [5] 
5 1985 Armamar Portugal 14 Viegas [4] 
6 1986 Águeda Portugal 16 Viegas [4] 
7 1990 Dude USA 6 Goens and Andrews [6] 
8 1994 Storm King USA 14 Butler et al. [7] 
9 1996 Loop USA 12 Countryman et al. [8] 
10 1999 Alajar Spain 4 Silva [9] 
11 1999 Tabuaço Portugal 2 Viegas et al. [10] 
12 2000 Palasca France 2 Raffalli et al. [11], Dold et al. [12] 
13 2000  Mação Portugal 2 Viegas et al. [10] 
14 2003 Cramer USA 2 Donoghue et al. [13] 
15 2003 Freixo Portugal 2 Viegas [1]                             
16 2005 Guadalajara Spain 11 Viegas and Caballero [14] 
17 2005 Mortágua Portugal 4 Viegas [15] 
18 2006 Famalicão Portugal 6 Viegas [15], Viegas et al. [16] 
19 2007 Kornati Island Croatia 11 Viegas et al. [17] 
 
Fire eruptions and especially those associated to canyons are not rare, but 
without a clear understanding of their causes and possible consequences even 
experienced operational persons tend to ignore or minimize their importance. 
Human losses like those shown in Table 1 cannot be neglected but even the 
occasional occurrence of accidents in some countries has not been sufficient to 
allow practitioners to develop an empirical knowledge about the phenomenon. 
The similarity between different accidents, like for example the Mann 
Gulch, the Storm King and the Cramer fires, has been noted in The Situational 
Awareness poster developed by the Boise National Forest with help from 
Missoula Technology and Development Center (MTDC) [18]. In all these cases a 
group of fire fighters was attempting to suppress a fire that was spreading down 
slope on steep hills or canyons when suddenly fire developed below them are 
erupted uphill and killed a large part of the group. In the first two cases the fire at 
the bottom of the slope or canyon was caused by spot fires. The issue of the 
similarity between Mann Gulch and Storm King was also addressed, but from a 
broader perspective, by Weick [19]. We found other similarities notably between 
the Palasca [11] and the Kornati [17] accidents, both in the shape of the canyon 
and in the fire development. 
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In this article the authors present the concept of eruptive fire and discuss 
critically some of the existing models or explanations of the phenomenon that can 
be found in the literature. 
Concept of Eruptive Fire 
In the context of the present article we apply the definition of eruptive fires to 
those in which a sudden change of the rate of spread of the head fire occurs in a 
very short lapse of time with or without the influence of any changes of the fire 
temporal or spatial boundary conditions (fuel properties, meteorological or 
topographical conditions). In our perspective this definition is applied strictly to 
fires that occur with uniform and permanent overall boundary conditions, but we 
will generalize it to other situations in order to include the role of other factors 
that are mentioned in literature. Eruptive fires are also known in literature as 
blowup or flashover. These last terms should be used with caution as they can be 
misleading. Indeed, eruptive fires do not correspond to the specific definition used 
in Fire Safety science for flashover in the built environment, as we are not dealing 
with fires in an enclosed space. Eruptive fires are characterized by a sudden 
change of the rate of spread and therefore of energy release. In Butler [7] one can 
find the following definition of blowup “a rapid transition from a surface fire 
exhibiting relatively low intensity, to a fire burning in the whole vegetation 
complex, surface to canopy and demonstrating dramatically larger flame heights, 
higher energy release rates, and faster rates of spread”. This definition invokes the 
participation of both surface and canopy fuels in the blowup although blowups or 
fire eruptions may occur in single layer fuels [2], [11] and [17]. Eruptive fire 
behaviour can also occur in wind induced fires when the wind direction is 
constant and the wind velocity is relatively high during a long period of time  
[20]. Fire eruptions are more likely to occur in steep slopes and especially in 
canyons because topography plays the role of a constant and strong constrain to 
the fire, which is similar to the role of a strong wind with a constant direction [1], 
[21]. The effect of topography does not vary in time whereas wind in the field is 
rarely constant in amplitude and direction. 
Classical fire behaviour modelling considers that the rate of spread of a fire 
depends on the following three sets of factors: (i) fuel bed properties, (ii) 
topography and (iii) meteorological conditions [22]. It is commonly assumed that 
if the parameters that characterize each set of factors are fixed there is a unique 
value of the rate of spread. In particular it is assumed that for a given fuel bed if 
one knows the terrain slope or the ambient wind velocity it is possible to 
determine the value of the rate of spread and to predict the behaviour of the fire. 
This assumption is referred in the literature as the concept triangle of the factors 
of fire. The effect of the dramatic increase in the fire rate of spread for high values 
of slope or wind has been observed many times for laboratory experiments [23-
27] but it has been analyzed only in terms of steady regime that considers the 
average rate of spread.  
Previous studies on fire blow up being based on the concept of fire triangle tended 
to consider the existence of a sudden change of some of one or more of the above 
mentioned factors to justify the rapid change of fire behaviour. As topography in 
the general case could not be invoked as a factor that changed suddenly it was 
overlooked in the analysis of the phenomenon; changes of fuel bed properties or 
4	  
meteorological conditions were more frequently assumed as the cause of fire 
acceleration. This is the reason why in many studies of incidents and accidents 
associated to fire eruptions a very detailed analysis of prevailing meteorological 
conditions tends to exist in order to find an explanation for fire acceleration, quite 
often without coming to positive conclusions [7], [4], [13], [8], [6], [28], [29]. 
Several studies [7], [9], [12] propose more than one possible explanation based of 
different arguments or interpretations of the facts. These studies invoke the 
occurrence of various atmospheric processes as the passage of a cold front above 
the fire, the presence of a thermal belt around vegetation and an atmospheric 
instability, among others. 
In Viegas [30], it was shown that this assumption is not correct in the general 
case, particularly in the presence of strong wind or steep slopes. The alternative 
concept of square of the factors of fire was proposed in Viegas [31] in which the 
factor of chronological time was added to the set of factors to illustrate the 
dynamic behaviour of forest fires, particularly in the case of eruptive fires. It 
corresponds to the accumulation of energy of the growing fire over time due to the 
feedback between that fire and its environment, leading to an extreme behaviour 
when the accumulated energy is enough to accelerate dramatically the fire rate of 
spread. This process is similar to flashovers, not in the physical sense but in the 
sense of being a self induced and dramatic evolution of the fire without any 
possibility of control. It should be noticed that the concept of the fire behaviour at 
a given time depending on the fire behaviour in the past has been introduced 
earlier by Albini [32] for classical fire behaviour. 
In the literature we can find diverse interpretations about the mechanism of fire 
acceleration that is associated to an eruption. The first kind of explanations is 
mainly based on a variation of the external conditions and the second kind is 
mainly based on the own properties of the spreading fire. The first kind includes 
the variation in external conditions as a change in wind intensity or direction, the 
development of a thermal belt around vegetation and the existence of atmospheric 
instabilities above the fire. The second one includes self-induced fire behaviour as 
a convective feed-back from the fire, a flow attachment, a gas accumulation or 
spotting. As the fire by itself involves strongly coupled phenomena and factors, it 
is difficult to separate the mechanisms causing eruptive behaviour from the 
conditions that favour its initiation. The authors consider that it is one of the 
reasons of the large diversity in interpretations that can be found in literature. This 
distinction is very important in the author’s viewpoint and will be developed in 
the following. 
 
Mechanisms contributing to fire acceleration 
In this section, the different mechanisms proposed in literature are detailed 
and discussed. Before developing them, a link is established with flame spread 
theory. 
Self-accelerating fires in flame spread theory 
The closest definition in flame spread theory to eruptive fires is self-
accelerating fires. These fires can occur during flame spread over the surface of 
either thermally thin or thermally thick solids. Flame spread theory for concurrent 
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flame spread suggests that under specific conditions there is no steady state 
solution and that flame spread can be self-acceleratory [33]. A simple application 
of the energy conservation leads to the following expression of the flame spread 
rate [33]: 
ig
p
f tdt
dx
V Δ==  (1) 
where Vf is the flame spread velocity, xp is the pyrolysis front position, D is a 
preheating length, and tig is the ignition time associated to the flame heat flux. 
Fundamental studies have given some limited results to predict flame 
spread [33] and a simple expression of the flame speed can be derived by stating 
that delta is proportional to the flame length, which is in turn proportional to the 
length of the pyrolysis area. This leads to the following empirical formula: 
( )nbp xx −=∝∝Δ length  flame  (2) 
where xb is the position of the burnout front and n is approximately 2/3 but 
may vary between 0.5 and 1 [33]. Combining Equations (1) and (2) gives:
 
( )nbp xxV −=∝ f 	   (3) 
 
It can be seen from Equation (3) that if the pyrolysis front (xp) moves 
faster than the burnout front (xb), then (xp – xb) increases and the flame spread rate 
accelerates, meaning a steady-state flame spread rate does not exist. An 
exponential growth is achieved if xb = 0 and n = 1. This expression is similar to 
equation (1) and suggests that an extension of Δ can lead to a self-accelerating 
fire.  
However, even if this model could apply to small scale fires, the 
assumption that the preheat length is proportional to the flame length, which is in 
turn proportional to the length of the pyrolysis area is difficult to verify in 
wildfires. Indeed, due to their large scale, wildland fires exhibit flame structures 
which are very different from the laboratory flames used to describe flame spread 
over solid surfaces [34]. Some physical explanations for self-accelerating 
wildfires are either proposed in [1] or in [35] and are discussed later in the paper. 
 
Positive feedback from the fire 
This interpretation was proposed by Viegas [1] and it consists essentially 
in considering the feedback effect caused by the convective flow induced by the 
existence of the fire front in the presence of wind or positive slope. Considering 
the case of wind it is reasoned that its presence transports oxygen to the reaction 
zone enhancing the combustion process and causing an increase of the flame 
length and of the rate of spread in a given time lapse; this increase of the flame 
will therefore entrain more ambient air and cause a further increase of the rate of 
spread in the following time lapse. If this feedback process is not inhibited by 
some external mechanism the rate of spread of the fire front will increase 
continuously in the course of time having the potential of reaching very high 
values. 
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Based on these considerations, Viegas proposed a mathematical model to 
predict the rate of spread of the head of an eruptive fire. For convenience a non 
dimensional rate of spread R’=R/Ro, where Ro is the so called basic rate of spread 
for a given fuel bed, under no wind and no slope conditions, is used. The rate of 
change of R’ is given by the following differential equation: 
211 '.)1'.(..'
)11(
21
1
1
bbb RRaba
dt
dR −
−=  (4) 
The parameters a1, a2, b1 and b2, in equation (4) are related to the rate of 
spread change with wind velocity and to the reaction time of the fuel bed. They 
were measured experimentally at laboratory and field scales and checked against 
real fire cases for several fuel beds [1, 31]. It was shown that after a finite interval 
of time the rate of spread starts to increase very rapidly as it is observed in fire 
eruptions. Experimental data obtained in the analysis of real cases [1, 2, 7, 14] and 
in a field experiment performed by the first author in 2001 (unpublished) show 
that for shrub fuels the time lag for the initiation of eruption is of the order of 15 
to 20 minutes which is consistent with the predictions of this model for this type 
of fuels. 
The mathematical model described by (4) is very robust and has been 
checked in various situations. One case that provided valuable data to validate this 
model and the convective feedback mechanism that it proposes was the accident 
of Freixo de Espada-a-Cinta that occurred in Portugal in August 2003 [1]. In this 
case a fire front erupted in a slope killing two persons. An automatic 
meteorological station placed above the slope recorded the meteorological 
parameters every ten minutes before, during and after it was reached by the very 
hot gases produced by the fire eruption. It registered a wind direction change of 
180º from a down slope wind with an average 17 km/h to an upslope wind of 56 
km/h when the fire erupted with gusts of 96 km/h. The time lag and the wind 
velocity increase are consistent with this model’s predictions. The Portuguese 
Meteorological Institute confirmed that in this case no changes in the synoptic 
conditions before or after the accident occurred. 
The solution of equation (4) indicates that the rate of spread of the fire can 
become many times larger than its value Ro, for horizontal terrain without wind, in 
the limit it tends to infinity. There are certainly physical limits in the process that 
should bind this limit to some finite value. It is interesting to note that according 
to Butler [7] the rate of spread of the erupting fire was one thousand times greater 
than Ro, as it is predicted by the model. To our knowledge no other fire spread 
models explain such a large order of magnitude variation on the rate of spread of a 
given fire in the same fuel bed and basically in the same topography without 
invoking changes in the overall boundary conditions. 
Although the parameters of the model can be determined from experiments 
there is not sufficient knowledge about the role of various factors, namely terrain 
configuration, fuel properties, presence of wind, type of ignition on these 
parameters, therefore more research is needed to explicitly include the different 
factors in the model. 
Gas accumulation 
This potential explanation is quite popular among fire fighters, despite the 
fact that very few studies provide elements to support it. This is mainly due to the 
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feeling of surviving fire fighters reported after a fire eruption that the fire looked 
like a pool fire or a hydrocarbon fire [11, 35]. In some cases it is described as a 
“fire ball” [29]. This empirical explanation, in spite of coming from situations of 
maximal stress, has become quite wide spread and it has to be taken into 
consideration. Butler et al. discarded it in their report of the South Canyon Fire 
[7]. 
Two explanations are proposed for gas accumulation: 
(i) The first one assumes the existence of an accumulation of unburned 
products coming from the fire plume - or coming from unburned pyrolysis 
gases produced elsewhere in the fire - and accumulating ahead of the fire 
in closed geometries like deep canyons. The created flammable mixture 
would then ignite when reached by the fire. This effect has been cited early 
as a potential source of fire eruption among others but without offering any 
scientific proof [29]. Dold et al. [36], report a similar phenomenon 
occurred in 2003 during a severe fire near Canberra, Australia. Fire 
fighters were engulfed in high flames while positioned far from the fire 
front on a flat parcel with very scarce vegetation. The authors deduce that 
this fire was due to an accumulation of unburned gases coming from the 
fire plume. A study on the Palasca incident, which occurred in Corsica 
(France) in 2000, mentions a possible gas accumulation in a canyon [12]. 
According to the testimony of surviving fire fighters [11], the head of the 
fire almost extinguished before the occurrence of a fire eruption; the 
presence of remaining vegetation with leaves that seemed to be 
caramelised and not totally burned are other indicators of unusual fire 
behaviour. It is proposed that the extinction of the head by fire fighters 
could have been only partially successful leading to the generation of 
pyrolysis gases that would otherwise have burnt in the head fire and these 
pyrolysis gases may have developed into flammable proportions upper in 
the canyon, causing what the authors call a ‘flashover’ when the flank fires 
reached the pool of flammable gases. One problem with the assumption of 
a flashover through the pyrolysis gases is that premixed flames can only 
propagate through relatively high concentrations of the combustible gases. 
For a premixed flame to propagate along such a large area - the 
phenomenon was estimated to have covered approximately 6 hectares - 
there should have been a build-up of combustible volatile organic 
compounds above the lower flammability limit over much of the area. But 
even if the flammability limit was not reached everywhere and if the 
mixture zone was not very deep inside or above vegetation, the overall 
effect could have been to enhance greatly the flame spread over the area. 
The development of this first flame could have initiated the widespread 
diffusion flame in a very flammable vegetation cover, which has been 
described by the crews as a lake of fire.  
 
(ii) The second explanation is related to the production of Volatile Organic 
Compounds (VOC) by vegetation at temperatures below the ignition point. 
When heated, some Mediterranean plants produce and emit VOC related 
to their secondary metabolism [37, 38]. These compounds possess a low 
ignition temperature [39]. As the density of VOC is higher than the density 
of air when vegetation is heated by the sun or by an approaching fire, the 
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emitted VOC would be released and could accumulate near the ground and 
below the vegetation layer or flow down slope to the bottom of a canyon. 
In the two cases, they would create a flammable mixture [35]. This 
explanation is supported by the empirical knowledge of fire fighters. They 
associate the strong odour of volatiles in vegetation with high risk, 
particularly in relatively confined geometries like canyons. The scientific 
aspect of the problem is to know if this accumulation of volatiles is 
sufficient enough to generate a flammable mixture with air or if it is only 
an indicator of vegetation stress due to heat impact or to dryness that are 
certainly related to high risk conditions. The paper by Raffalli et al. [11] 
cites clearly a VOC accumulation as a potential cause for several fire 
accidents occurred in France [11]. The authors described these accidents 
and deduced that they were linked to gas accumulation because of several 
factors like a sudden ignition of a large area of vegetation and smoke 
accumulation. For this reason these authors decided to study the emission 
of VOC of one Mediterranean plant species (Rosmarinus officinalis), 
which is known to release a substantial amount of VOC. The experiments 
showed that the plant was producing a lot of flammable gases but at 
temperatures over 90oC (the peak being around 170°C). This VOC 
emission has been confirmed also in Ormeño et al. [40] for lower 
temperatures. However, no concentration studies were conducted to check 
if any flammable mixture could be encountered in the field. Some 
laboratory-scale experiments were also conducted but no link between the 
full-scale phenomenon, the small-scale tests and the VOC production 
measured with plant powders in the laboratory was established. However, 
the main advantage of this study was to point out that plants can release 
highly flammable gases at relatively low temperatures. Some other studies 
show that the flammability of vegetation increases with the presence of 
VOC in plants [41, 42]. 
To our knowledge the only study considering VOC emissions by heated 
plants and the flammability of the mixture of the released gas in air is the 
one presented in Chetehouna et al. [43]. This study used a hermetic 
enclosure and a radiant panel to heat different Rosmarinus officinalis 
plants by radiation (as a fire approaching would supposedly do). The 30 
cm high plants were placed at the centre of the small enclosure and had a 
moisture content of 70%, which is close to the one expected for average 
summer conditions. The plants were heated during 30 minutes with 
radiative fluxes ranging from 0.5 to 20.5 kW/m2. The emitted gases 
trapped into the enclosure were sampled thanks to adsorbent tubes and 
analysed by gas chromatography and gas spectrometry. Then, the lower 
flammability limit was estimated as a function of the temperature of the 
enclosure [39]. The study showed that generally the VOC concentrations 
were under the flammability limit, except for heat fluxes over 15 kW/m2 
and enclosure temperatures above 170°C. These values are consistent with 
the temperature of maximal VOC emission found in Raffalli et al. [11]. 
This study did not show a clear VOC accumulation that could create 
flammable mixtures in the field because the tested laboratory conditions 
are very unlikely to occur in other places than very close to the fire where 
no accumulation would have time to take place. However, this study 
represents a first evaluation of VOCs emitted by vegetation and two 
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conclusions arise: the VOC emitted by the plant could play a role on plant 
flammability close to the fire and it is worth investigating further the 
potential accumulation of these gases for very peculiar and extreme 
conditions in the field (as high temperature, long exposure to sun radiation, 
low air humidity, condensation of the products near the ground, among 
others). The first conclusions lead to the question of the existence of 
species prone to support fire eruption by high rates of VOC emission either 
by increasing the plant flammability or creating VOC accumulation in air. 
Because wildfires are occurring in open spaces a gas accumulation seems 
to be unlikely to occur and even more to lead to large pockets of flammable 
mixtures. However, it is impossible to exclude that this phenomenon can occur 
under very specific conditions and could initiate or create a fire eruption. It is 
therefore necessary to further investigate this potential cause and to obtain data to 
demonstrate and understand the creation of flammable gas mixtures by 
accumulated smoke of VOC. 
 
Flow attachment 
This interpretation has been proposed recently by Dold and Zinoviev [44]. 
Their model is not formally linked to flow attachment in confined slopes but the 
authors refer to this notion to interpret the eruptive behaviour described by the 
model. This work proposes that the flow-field around a fire can change from a 
usual steady-state spreading of the fire into an eruptive fire behaviour for which 
the spread rate and the intensity of the fire can grow infinitely. The model is 
developed based on a previous work by Albini [32], which considers that the fire 
behaviour at a given time is influenced by the fire behaviour in the past of the fire. 
This quite intuitive feature cannot be included by essence in steady-state models 
as Rothermel’s model [22], which is the most used fire spread model for 
operational purposes [45, 46]. Except for the work by Viegas [1], this paper 
represents to our knowledge the only other attempt to model eruptive fire 
behaviour. In Dold and Zinoviev [44], the final representation of the model is the 
classical formulation of fire rate of spread and intensity but including a non-steady 
rate of spread. The non-steady rate of spread is assumed to vary as a power-law of 
the fire-line intensity. The behaviour of the fire is discussed for different values of 
the power law exponent: if the exponent is less than 1, the spread rate will tend 
towards the steady rate of spread and if the exponent is greater than or equal to 1, 
the fire will erupt. The power-law dependence between the rate of spread and the 
fire-line intensity is not directly supported by experimental evidences given by the 
authors. In [47], the fire intensity of a burner is linked to the height of flame 
following the classical analysis of Cox and Chitty [48] and can be considered as 
an indirect justification of a power-law relationship between the fire rate of spread 
and the fire intensity. The model is also indirectly related to the self-accelerating 
fires described previously as the fire-intensity is related to the length of the 
pyrolysis zone. However, as stated before, these links are less straightforward for 
wildfire than for flame spread theory, due to the scale of the phenomenon. 
The laboratory experiments presented in the paper demonstrate the change 
in the mechanism of fire spread when the slope angle is above a threshold value. 
Early studies depicted flow and more specifically flame deflection towards a 
plane slope for positive tilt angles above 20° [49, 50]. For trench configurations, 
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the effect is greatly enhanced by the restriction of air entrainment [51, 52]. This 
effect is called the ‘Trench Effect’ [53]. In trench fires, the flames attach to the 
fuel when the slope angle is above a threshold value [51]. The flame attachment 
increases dramatically the heat transfer to the unburned fuel and consequently the 
fire rate of spread. The laboratory experiments described in the paper reproduce 
the configuration depicted in [51, 52], which were conducted to study the lethal 
fire that occurred in an escalator of King’s Cross subway station in 1987 in 
London. The main difference is the use of wild land fuels at the lower side of the 
trench. The authors cite a paper on flame length and inclination, which was 
published in the same special issue dedicated to the fire at King’s Cross Station 
[47] but the study would have gained in power if a comparison was conducted 
between the two sets of experiments and particularly the ones with fire spread [51, 
52].Then, the authors show that when the slope angle is above a threshold value, 
the flow at the top of the trench is reversing from backward to upward. These 
features have already been described by Atkinson et al. [54] for fires on inclined 
surfaces.  
As a whole, the main strength of the paper is to propose a new 
mathematical model based on simple assumptions to describe eruptive behaviour. 
More research is certainly essential to justify or validate the assumptions of the 
model. For instance, the model and experiments describe a linear fire front but 
past accidents show clearly that many eruptions occur for non linear fronts [15, 
55]. The work would also merit a better link with existing fire science literature. 
Change in wind direction or velocity 
Wind is by far the factor that is invoked more frequently, given its great influence 
on the rate of spread of the fire front and its natural variability and apparent 
unpredictability in the short term. Very often an incident or an accident is 
described as being associated to a sudden wind change, whatever could have been 
the cause of such a change. In some cases this wind change is said to be caused by 
the passage of a meteorological front. In Byram [56] wind turbulence is associated 
to erratic fire behaviour, namely the onset of fire blowup and fire whirls. 
An example of the use of this explanation is given in the Loop Fire accident report 
[8] in which the authors admit that the fire was being blown down slope by a very 
strong and dry (the so called Santa Anna) wind. In order to adjust this fact with 
the reality that the fire that was burning in the lower part of the canyon actually 
blew up and spread very rapidly against the prevailing wind - killing eleven fire 
fighters in its run - the authors make the following surprising statement “Wind 
direction may switch 180 degrees and back again only in few seconds. Dense 
smoke clings to the ground and the winds drive a hail of burning embers into the 
unburned fuel ahead of the fire”. In the same report the authors admitted that 
careful observation of the wind pattern on the site in conditions similar to those of 
the accident did not evidence any wind shift. 
Another example is given by the Storm King Mountain accident report [7] in 
which a spot fire that ignited at the bottom of a very steep slope blew up burning 
it entirely in less than 20 minutes killing 14 fire fighters that were working on its 
flank trying to suppress it. In order to justify the sudden change in fire behaviour 
the authors of that report invoke complex interactions between the general wind 
and local winds induced by the topography including a Venturi effect to explain 
the flow acceleration near the top of the slope. In the case of this accident a 
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change of wind direction that was caused by the passage of a weather front 
actually occurred sometime before the accident. One of the consequences of this 
change was a modification of the general behaviour of the fire but in our opinion 
the key factor to produce the fire eruption was the already mentioned spot fire at 
the bottom of the slope where the group of fire fighters was working. According 
to [7] the area burned during around 20 minutes in the eruption that resulted from 
this spot was much larger than the area burned by the initial ignition during three 
days.  
Byram [57] considered that the vertical wind velocity profile, associated to other 
factors, was of great importance in the development of a blowup. In particular he 
considered that the existence of a low level jet was determinant for the occurrence 
of a blowup. Dieterich [58] also considers the existence of a low level jet to 
explain the differences in fire behaviour between Willow fire and Dudley Lake 
fires. This same idea is followed also by Aronovitch [59] several years later but 
concluding that it is only a possible explanation for some of the cases that were 
analysed. 
The effect of the wind on the fire spread is obvious and it seems that it can 
provoke fire acceleration in steep slopes as during the field experiment conducted 
at ADAI described in [44]. However, many fire eruptions occurred under no or 
low wind conditions as has been observed in their laboratory experiments that are 
performed in the quiescent air conditions of an enclosed laboratory. Let us assume 
that wind flow exists and that it is parallel to the slope gradient or to the canyon 
water line and blowing upwards. In this case it will certainly favour the 
occurrence of fire eruption in conjunction with steep slopes or canyon 
topographies. We nevertheless remark that even in the presence of contrary wind, 
like in [8] a fire eruption in a canyon can occur. 
A concept that is commonly accepted in the literature is that of the existence of a 
“potential rate of spread” that is the results of a fire accelerating in given 
boundary conditions to reach a steady state of spread [60-63]. According to this 
assumption for a given fuel bed, an ignition pattern and boundary terrain and 
meteorological conditions there is a well defined “potential rate of spread”. This 
concept is clearly in contradiction with flame spread theory and the different 
models developed to represent fire eruptions. Furthermore it was shown in [30] 
that a condition of a steady state does not exist in a fire spreading in a forest. In 
that study it was shown that a steady state of fire spread does not exist in the 
controlled conditions of a laboratory test even in some permanent and uniform 
boundary conditions. Besides this our experiments show that there is not a defined 
limit to the rate of spread [1, 64] and field observations [1], [7] confirm this 
statement. If for example we analyse the results of field experiments of Mc Alpine 
and Wakimoto (figure 3 of [61]) and of Mc Rae (figures 4 and 5 of [60]) it is 
difficult to establish that there is a limit to the rate of spread from those 
experiments. 
Thermal belt and Atmospheric instability 
The first explanation is based on an assumed change of the third factor: 
fuel bed properties. It is observed that in certain atmospheric and topographic 
conditions the temperature and relative humidity diurnal cycle between intervals 
of altitudes in mountainous terrain is such that the moisture content of the fuel 
between those altitudes remains lower than that below or above these altitudes. 
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According to this explanation a fire that started in a given slope below this 
“thermal belt” would accelerate because it would reach a fuel with lower moisture 
content. This fact was invoked by some authors (cf. Butler et al. [7], Donoghue et 
al. [13]) to justify the change in fire behaviour once the fire front enters the dryer 
fuel. 
Regarding the second explanation, it is well known that when the vertical 
structure of the atmosphere is unstable hot gases produced by combustion can 
raise much more easily inducing more air entrainment at ground level and 
facilitating fire growth. This explanation is followed by several authors namely 
Byram[57], Aronovitch[59], Schroeder[65], Goens [6]. Interestingly Byram [57] 
proposes a Unifying Concept associated to the energy conversion that in his 
opinion can be reduced to three groups of factors: (i) Stability conditions in the 
atmosphere, (ii) Wind speed and wind shear in the atmosphere and (iii) Fuel (and 
stand) conditions. To this he adds the following phrase: “Strangely enough, 
topography as such does not appear directly in the above groups of factors; its 
major effects can be handled most simply by letting them operate through groups 
1 and 2”. We disagree with this point of view as we have found that topography 
alone can be a major factor of a fire eruption or blowup, without requiring any of 
the other factors of groups (1) and (2) that Byram considers.  
Although these factors may have contributed in some cases they do not 
explain at all the occurrence of fire eruptions in the absence of such thermal belts 
or unstable atmospheres. And like previous potential causes, they are not likely to 
explain alone a fire eruption even if they contribute to the onset of the event. 
Spot fires 
Some authors, Butler et al. [7] and Countryman et al [8], refer that the 
increase of the rate of spread of the fire front, is due to a process of short distance 
spotting ahead of the main fire. The present authors have observed many 
situations of fire eruptions without the occurrence of spotting or at least when this 
could be indicated as being the main process of fire advance [1]. Actually this is 
observed in all laboratory experiments in canyons where fire eruptions occur 
without the presence of spot fires ahead of the fire front.  
It is normal that given the very large increase of the fire line intensity with 
the creation of strong convective winds above and ahead of the fire burning 
particles are launched as spot fires at small or even large distance of the main fire 
front, but as we have remarked above that fire eruptions can occur even without 
spotting, in many cases this mechanism should be regarded as a consequence 
rather than a cause of rapid fire spread. 
In some cases, like for example in the accident of Guadalajara [14], 
spotting at the bottom of a canyon seems to have started a new fire that developed 
quickly as an eruptive fire before the fire fighters could even notice the existence 
of a new fire under them and feel any increase in danger. In this case, spotting 
appears clearly to have created a supplementary risk of fire eruption but only as an 
ignition source of new fires in the canyon. A similar event happened in the South 
Canyon fire in which a set of spot fires that fell on a place designated as the 
“Bowl” actually started the fire eruption on the West Drainage slope that 
ultimately killed the fire-fighters [7].  
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There are some reported fires like Sundance [20] and Bomb Range [66] 
that spread under a constant direction wind that had an increasing rate of spread in 
spite of the fact that the wind velocity did not increase as well. Although the 
terrain was not flat in all these cases topography did not seem to play a major role 
as the fire spread very rapidly both upslope and down slope. In these major fires 
in which a wind induced eruption occurred it is interesting to observe that the rate 
of spread does not increase continuously but in an oscillatory form. This is clearly 
reported in [20] and [66] in which we see that short distance spot fires can play an 
important role to promote an increase of the rate of spread by burning a large area 
ahead of the main fire front in a relatively short time. While this area is burning a 
high plume is formed, blocking wind action and slowing down the fire. Then 
more spot fires are produced and the rate of spread increases another step. It is 
very probable that in some of the fires that occurred in Australia, on the 7th of 
February 2009 [67] a similar effect must have occurred. These fires include 
clearly acceleration and they could also be considered in the category of wind 
induced fire eruptions, but more research is needed to include all the involved 
factors. 
 
 
General discussion and conclusion 
The scientific studies on eruptive fire behaviour are quite scarce and 
recent. Among the different contributors, the ADAI team developed a systematic 
way to reproduce fire eruptions in the laboratory for steep slope and canyon 
shaped configurations under constant external conditions besides proposing a 
simple and consistent semi-empirical model that provides a general explanation 
for it. Some other explanations as flame attachment, gas accumulation or spotting 
also try to describe mechanisms involved in the fire. 
Many of the explanations due to a variation of the external factors do not 
provide a direct explanation of the mechanism of fire eruption but provide more 
explanations about the onset of the phenomenon. Furthermore, they invoke the 
occurrence of some rare atmospheric processes that can give the dangerous feeling 
of extremely rare and unavoidable events. Some interpretations (cf. [68]) mention 
the “alignment of factors” meaning that when some factors occur simultaneously 
under given conditions, then a blow up will occur. The probability of the 
occurrence of most of these factors either isolated or connected, as some 
interpretations of this phenomenon require, can be assumed to be very small. 
Thus, the message that is conveyed by the literature is that fire eruptions should 
occur rarely and by surprise. 
In the opinion of the present authors the various explanations that were 
presented to explain the process of fire eruption do not have the same generality. 
Some of them can play some role in certain cases but in some of them more 
research is required to validate their relevance to real cases. 
Even if some phenomena can favour the onset of an eruptive fire, the 
concept of “alignment of factors” or other explanations that are based on the 
occurrence of some conditions like atmospheric instability, a wind change, a 
thermal belt and others, should be avoided in fire fighters training because they 
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can induce the dangerous idea that fire eruptions occur rarely and by surprise and 
can lead to the development of some fatalism. In our opinion these interpretations 
do not contribute for the development of sound Fire Safety procedures for fire-
fighting aiming to decrease the number of accidents and fatalities. 
Fire eruptions in canyons can no longer be considered as a surprising or 
rare event. Actually they are both frequent and predictable. Fortunately not all 
cases result in accidents or fatalities. The analysis of past situations shows that 
experience alone is not sufficient to avoid this type of accidents, as many of the 
victims of the reported accidents were experienced fire fighters. 
For all these reasons, the authors really trust that more research is 
necessary in order to complete the current state of the art and to develop a network 
of specialists who could investigate each case in a systematic and rigorous way. In 
parallel, more experimental and field experiments, as well as more modelling 
have to be conducted in order to better understand the set of parameters driving 
eruptive fire behaviour. This would lead to the classification of Fire Eruption 
types with their favourable conditions of occurrence, allowing the development of 
risk indexes for canyons and the creation of specific Fire Safety procedures for 
fire fighters. 
In our opinion it is necessary to promote more research on this process of 
eruptive fires and then disseminate the message clearly to fire fighters and 
population in general to increase awareness, avoid misconceptions or erroneous 
concepts and consequently reduce the chances for the repetition of this type of 
accidents. 
A breakthrough in this topic would be to obtain a classification of the 
different mechanisms involved in eruptive fires combined with the conditions that 
would increase the risk of occurrence. This objective can be reached only by 
increasing the research in this field. A good way to do it would be to include more 
fire science in the study of extreme wildfires. 
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